

User Authentication through Keystroke Dynamics

Johannes Luig


Overview

- ▶ Introduction
- ▶ Measurable Characteristics
- ▶ How to measure „Similarity“?
- ▶ User Authentication
- ▶ Performance


Introduction

Biometric Features


Introduction



Introduction



Introduction



Introduction

► Motivation:


- Typing on keyboard does not produce continuous stream of non-stop data, but distinctive patterns
- Human actions are predictable in the performance of repetitive and routine tasks
- No specific (expensive) tools needed
- Method is reasonable (even „hidden check“ possible)

Measurable Characteristics

- ▶ Hold Time
- ▶ Interkey Time
- ▶ Press/Release Latency

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
Measurable Characteristics

- ▶ Hold Time
- ▶ Interkey Time
- ▶ Press/Release Latency




Measurable Characteristics

- ▶ Hold Time
- ▶ Interkey Time
- ▶ Press/Release Latency




Measurable Characteristics

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Measurable Characteristics

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Measurable Characteristics


► Timing

- Internal CPU clock
 - 8253 timer in IBM-compatible computers
 - BIOS microsecond timing function

Measurable Characteristics

► Timing

- Example: simulation of remote situation




from Bergadano et al.:
„User Authentication through
Keystroke Dynamics“

Measurable Characteristics

► Timing

- Example: simulation of remote situation



from Bergadano et al.:
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Keystroke Dynamics“

How to measure „Similarity“? (I)

- ▶ General approach:
 - Measure hold and/or interkey times
 - Measurement data = vectors in vector space
 - Identify typing person using traditional pattern recognition techniques or Neural Network paradigms

How to measure „Similarity“? (I)

- ▶ Pattern recognition techniques include:
 - **k-Means Clustering**
 - Cosine Measure
 - Minimum Distance
 - Bayes' Rule
 - Potential Function

How to measure „Similarity“? (I)

► Pattern recognition techniques include:

- **k-Means Clustering**
- Cosine Measure
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- cluster data into k partitions
- try to find centers of „natural“ clusters
- minimize intra-cluster variance (squared error):

$$V = \sum_{i=1}^k \sum_{x_j \in S_i} (x_j - \mu_i)^2$$

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- cosine of angle between two feature vectors:

$$s^{(C)}(\mathbf{x}_a, \mathbf{x}_b) = \frac{\mathbf{x}_a^\dagger \mathbf{x}_b}{\|\mathbf{x}_a\|_2 \cdot \|\mathbf{x}_b\|_2}$$

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- euclidean distance:

$$\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (p_i - q_i)^2}$$

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- relates conditional and marginal probability distributions of random variables to each other

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B)}$$

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How to measure „Similarity“? (I)

▶ Pattern recognition techniques include:

- k-Means Clustering
- Cosine Measure
- Minimum Distance
- Bayes' Rule
- **Potential Function**

- A vector v has a potential function F , if

$$\text{grad}(F) = v$$

How to measure „Similarity“? (I)

- ▶ Neural Network paradigms include:
 - **Backpropagation**
 - Fuzzy ARTMAP
 - Radial Basis Functions
 - Learning Vector Quantization
 - (Hybrid) Sum-of-Products

How to measure „Similarity“? (I)

► Neural Network paradigms include:

- **Backpropagation**
 - Fuzzy ARTMAP
 - Radial Basis Functions
 - Learning Vector Quantization
 - (Hybrid) Sum-of-Products
- feed-forward multilayer network
 - input for each unit = sum of outputs of previous units
 - „gradient descent algorithm“ (weights are moved along negative gradient)

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- supervised Neural Network with very fast convergence
- comparable to Multilayer Perceptron

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- Backpropagation
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- **Radial Basis Functions**
- Learning Vector Quantization
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- real-valued functions, whose values depend only on the distance from center
- popular: Gaussians

$$y(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{i=1}^N w_i \phi(\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{c}_i\|),$$

How to measure „Similarity“? (I)

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How to measure „Similarity“? (I)

▶ Neural Network paradigms include:

- Backpropagation
 - Fuzzy ARTMAP
 - Radial Basis Functions
 - **Learning Vector Quant.**
 - (Hybrid) Sum-of-Products
- supervised competitive network
 - goal: find some kind of structure in data by determining in which way it is clustered

How to measure „Similarity“? (I)

- ▶ Neural Network paradigms include:
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 - **(Hybrid) Sum-of-Products**

How to measure „Similarity“? (I)


▶ Neural Network paradigms include:

- Backpropagation
 - Fuzzy ARTMAP
 - Radial Basis Functions
 - Learning Vector Quantization
 - **(Hybrid) Sum-of-Products**
- backpropagation network with modified layer connections
 - input for each unit = product of outputs of previous unit with weighting factor


Performance

► Pattern Recognition Techniques

from Obaidat/Sadoun:
„Keystroke Dynamics
based Authentication“



Classification based on **Interkey Times**




Classification based on **Hold Times**


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


Classification based on **Hold Times**


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


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


Classification based on **Hold and Interkey Times**

Performance

► Pattern Recognition Techniques

from Obaidat/Sadoun:
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


Classification based on **Hold and Interkey Times**


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Classification based on **Interkey Times**




Classification based on **Hold Times**


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Classification based on **Interkey Times**




Classification based on **Hold Times**

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


Classification based on **Hold and Interkey Times**

Performance

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Classification based on **Hold and Interkey Times**

How to measure „Similarity“? (2)

- ▶ Alternative Approach (*Bergadano et al.*):
 - Measure duration (latency) of trigraphs and sort them in ascending order
 - Define distance between two samples as the „degree of disorder“ between sorted trigraphs
 - Normalize distance by maximum degree of disorder

How to measure „Similarity“? (2)

Example: User is asked to type ***austria***

Trigraph	aus	ust	str	tri	ria
Duration	277 ms	231 ms	281 ms	248 ms	295 ms

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sorted version

ust	tri	aus	str	ria
231	248	277	281	295

How to measure „Similarity“? (2)

Example: User is asked to type ***austria***

Trigraph	aus	ust	str	tri	ria
Duration	277 ms	231 ms	281 ms	248 ms	295 ms

sorted version

ust	tri	aus	str	ria
231	248	277	281	295

$d = 1$

$d = 2$

$d = 2$

$d = 1$

$d = 0$

How to measure „Similarity“? (2)

Example: User is asked to type **austria**

Trigraph	aus	ust	str	tri	ria
Duration	277 ms	231 ms	281 ms	248 ms	295 ms

sorted version

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d = 1

d = 2


d = 2

d = 1

d = 0

max. degree of disorder:

$$\frac{|array|^2 - 1}{2}$$



$$d_{\text{norm}} = \frac{1+2+2+1+0}{12} = 0.5$$

How to measure „Similarity“? (2)

Sample 1 (sorted)

ust	tri	aus	str	ria
231	248	277	281	295

How to measure „Similarity“? (2)

Sample 1 (sorted)

ust	tri	aus	str	ria
231	248	277	281	295

Sample 2 (sorted)

str	tri	ust	ria	aus
222	236	254	269	280

$d = 3$

$d = 0$

$d = 2$

$d = 1$

$d = 2$

How to measure „Similarity“? (2)

Sample 1 (sorted)

ust	tri	aus	str	ria
231	248	277	281	295

Sample 2 (sorted)

str	tri	ust	ria	aus
222	236	254	269	280

d = 3

d = 0

d = 2

d = 1

d = 2

$$d(S1, S2) = \frac{3+0+2+1+2}{12} = 0.6666$$

How to measure „Similarity“? (2)

► User Classification

- Compute „mean distance“ of incoming sample to each user's model (all available samples of that user)

$$\text{md}(A, X) = (d(A_1, X) + d(A_2, X) + d(A_3, X) + d(A_4, X)) / 4$$

$$\text{md}(B, X) = (d(B_1, X) + d(B_2, X) + d(B_3, X)) / 3$$

$$\text{md}(C, X) = (d(C_1, X) + d(C_2, X) + d(C_3, X) + d(C_4, X) + d(C_5, X)) / 5$$

X current incoming sample

A, B, C ... user models consisting of Samples $A_{1...n}$, $B_{1...n}$, $C_{1...n}$

User Authentication

▶ Access Control System

- Samples may be provided by illegal users with unknown typing patterns

➔ even if FAR = 0%, best possible IPR = $(100/N)\%$

▶ Condition:

- Input sample must not only be closer to a certain model than to any other model; it must be sufficiently close to this model

User Authentication

▶ Access Control System

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„Impostor Pass Rate“

→ even if FAR = 0%, best possible IPR = (100/N)%

„False Alarm Rate“

▶ Condition:

- Input sample must not only be closer to a certain model than to any other model; it must be sufficiently close to this model

User Authentication

► Use of Thresholds

- Compute mean value of „inner-model“ distances:

$$m(A) = (d(A_1, A_2) + d(A_1, A_3) + d(A_1, A_4) + d(A_2, A_3) + d(A_2, A_4) + d(A_3, A_4)) / 6$$

- Classify sample X as belonging to A , if (and only if):

$$md(A, X) < m(A) + |k * (md(B, X) - m(A))|$$

$md(B, X)$... mean value of „second closest“ model

A, B, C ... user models consisting of Samples $A_{1...n}, B_{1...n}, C_{1...n}$

User Authentication

► Values for k:

- $k = 1$: plain classification scenario
- $k = 0.5$: $md(A, X)$ closer to $m(A)$ than to any other $md(B, X)$
- $k = 0.33$: $md(A, X)$ twice as close to $m(A)$ than to $md(B, X)$

$$md(A, X) < m(A) + |k * (md(B, X) - m(A))|$$

$md(B, X)$... mean value of „second closest“ model

A, B, C ... user models consisting of Samples $A_{1...n}$, $B_{1...n}$, $C_{1...n}$

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Value of k	$k = 1$	$k = 0.66$	$k = 0.5$	$k = 0.33$	$k = 0.3$
N. of successful attacks out of 71500 attempts	1650	98	30	2	0
N. of failed legal connections out of 220 attempts	0	0	4	13	16
Impostor Pass Rate	2.3077%	0.1371%	0.042%	0.0028%	0%
False Alarm Rate	0%	0%	1.8182%	5.9091%	7.2727%

from Bergadano et al.:
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$md(B, X)$... mean value of „second closest“ model

A, B, C ... user models consisting of Samples $A_{1...n}, B_{1...n}, C_{1...n}$

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$md(B, X)$... mean value of „second closest“ model

A, B, C ... user models consisting of Samples $A_{1...n}, B_{1...n}, C_{1...n}$

User Authentication

► Additional filtering

- Thresholds improve classification results but may have counterintuitive behavior:

$$\text{md}(\text{A}, \text{X}) = 0.307025$$

$$\text{md}(\text{B}, \text{X}) = 0.420123$$

$$\text{md}(\text{C}, \text{X}) = 0.423223$$

$$d(\text{A}_1, \text{A}_2) = 0.212378$$

$$d(\text{A}_1, \text{A}_3) = 0.204381$$

$$d(\text{A}_2, \text{A}_3) = 0.226024$$

$$m(\text{A}) = 0.214261$$

$$\text{md}(\text{A}, \text{X}) < m(\text{A}) + |k * (\text{md}(\text{B}, \text{X}) - m(\text{A}))|$$

User Authentication

► Additional filtering

- Thresholds improve classification results but may have counterintuitive behavior:

$$\text{md}(A, X) = 0.307025$$

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$$0.307025 < 0.214261 + |0.5 * (0.420123 - 0.214261)|$$



User Authentication

► Additional filtering

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$$\text{md}(A, X) = 0.307025$$

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$$d(A_2, A_3) = 0.226024$$

$$\bullet \quad m(A) = 0.214261$$

$$0.307025 < 0.214261 + |0.5 * (0.420123 - 0.214261)|$$



User Authentication

► Additional filtering

- For each sample, compute mean distance w.r.t. all the other samples in the model:

$$m(A_{xyz}) = (d(A_x, A_y) + d(A_x, A_z) + d(A_y, A_z)) / 3$$

$$dA_1 = | (d(A_1, A_2) + d(A_1, A_3) + d(A_1, A_4)) / 3 - m(A_{234}) |$$

$$dA_2 = | (d(A_2, A_1) + d(A_2, A_3) + d(A_2, A_4)) / 3 - m(A_{134}) |$$

$$dA_3 = | (d(A_3, A_1) + d(A_3, A_2) + d(A_3, A_4)) / 3 - m(A_{124}) |$$

$$dA_4 = | (d(A_4, A_1) + d(A_4, A_2) + d(A_4, A_3)) / 3 - m(A_{123}) |$$

User Authentication

► Additional filtering

- For each sample, compute mean distance w.r.t. all the other samples in the model:

$$m(A_{xyz}) = (d(A_x, A_y) + d(A_x, A_z) + d(A_y, A_z)) / 3$$

$$dA_1 = | (d(A_1, A_2) + d(A_1, A_3) + d(A_1, A_4)) / 3 - m(A_{234}) |$$

$$dA_2 = | (d(A_2, A_1) + d(A_2, A_3) + d(A_2, A_4)) / 3 - m(A_{134}) |$$

$$dA_3 = | (d(A_3, A_1) + d(A_3, A_2) + d(A_3, A_4)) / 3 - m(A_{124}) |$$

$$dA_4 = | (d(A_4, A_1) + d(A_4, A_2) + d(A_4, A_3)) / 3 - m(A_{123}) |$$

$$md(A, X) < m(A) + a * \max(dA_1, dA_2, dA_3, dA_4) + b * \text{std}(dA_1, dA_2, dA_3, dA_4)$$

User Authentication

► Additional filtering

- For each sample, compute mean distance w.r.t. all the other samples in the model:

value of k value of a value of b	$k = 0.5$ $a = 1$ $b = 1.5$	$k = 0.5$ $a = 1$ $b = 1.75$	$k = 0.5$ $a = 1.5$ $b = 0$	$k = 0.5$ $a = 1.5$ $b = 0.5$	no k $a = 1.5$ $b = 0.5$	$k = 0.55$ $a = 1.22$ $b = 1.25$
Successful attacks (out of 71500)	3	5	4	7	1032	7
Failed legal connections (out of 220)	12	9	10	8	5	4
IPR	0.0042%	0.007%	0.0056%	0.0098%	1.4433%	0.0098%
FAR	5.4545%	4.0909%	4.5454%	3.6364%	2.2727%	1.8182%

from Bergadano et al.:
„User Authentication through
Keystroke Dynamics“

$$\text{md}(A, X) < m(A) + a * \max(dA_1, dA_2, dA_3, dA_4) + b * \text{std}(dA_1, dA_2, dA_3, dA_4)$$

User Authentication

► Additional filtering

- For each sample, compute mean distance w.r.t. all the other samples in the model:

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How to measure „Similarity“? (2)

► Advantages

- Measure considers relative values of various typing features only
- No need for specific tuning or training
- Typing errors allowed (additional pre-filtering to keep only the shared trigraphs)

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Thank you.